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Abstract
In this paper, we study the effect of skill-biased technological change on unemploy-
ment and wage inequality in the presence and in the absence of a link between social
benefits and average income. In the former case, an increase in the productivity of
skilled workers and hence their wage leads to an increase in average income and hence
in benefits. The increased fallback income, in turn, makes unskilled workers ask for
higher wages. As higher wages are not justified by respective productivity increases,
unemployment rises. More generally, we show that skill-biased technological change
leads to increasing unemployment of the unskilled and to a moderately increasing
wage inequality when benefits are endogenous.
The model provides a theoretical explanation for diverging dynamics in wage in-
equality and unemployment under different social benefits regimes: Analyzing the
social legislation in 14 countries, we find that benefits are linked to the evolution of
average income in Continental Europe but not in the U.S. and the UK. Given this
institutional difference, our model predicts that skill-biased technological change leads
to rising unemployment in Continental Europe and rising wage inequality in the U.S.
and the UK.
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Benefits
JEL Classification: E24, J31, O30
∗We are grateful to Philippe Aghion, Nicole Gu¨rtzgen, Martin Hellwig, Melanie Lu¨hrmann, Lia Pacelli,
Thomas Zwick, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions and to Jenny Meyer
and Iliyan Stankov for excellent research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.
†MEA, Universita¨t Mannheim, Germany, E-Mail: weiss@mea.uni-mannheim.de
‡ZEW Mannheim, Germany, E-Mail: garloff@zew.de
1 Introduction
In this paper, we develop a model that is able to account for the differential employment
and wage dynamics in Europe and the U.S./UK.
The well documented increase in wage inequality in the U.S. and the UK in the 1980s
and early 1990s is attributed to an increase in the demand for skills that has been faster
than the increase in skills supply. Predominantly so-called skill-biased technological change
is blamed for the rapid increase in the demand of skills.1 In most of Continental Europe,
wage inequality increased much less if at all; instead it experienced a significant increase
of unemployment, especially of the low-skilled. As an illustration, figure 1 and 2 draw the
development of wage inequality and low-skilled unemployment, respectively, for the U.S.
and for Germany.
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Figure 1: Wage Inequality in the U.S. and in Germany. Data sources and definitions in
Appendix A.2.
Mainly, three arguments have emerged in the literature to explain the different devel-
opments in wage inequality. First, some authors argue that the supply of skills increased
faster in Europe than in the U.S./UK (see Nickell and Layard (1999), Card, Kramarz,
and Lemieux (1999) and Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van Ophem (2003)). Second, and more
recently, it has been argued that the demand for high-skilled increased less in Europe, be-
cause there, high wages for the low-skilled workers creates an incentive for firms to invest
in unskill-biased technologies, implying that technical progress is on average less skill-
biased in Europe (see Acemoglu (2003)). These two approaches, however, do not address
the transatlantic differences in unemployment. The third, and maybe most important,
approach argues that collective bargaining and labor market institutions kept the wage
1See, eg, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998), Katz and Autor (1999),
and Acemoglu (2002). Other factors affecting the relative demand for skills that have been identified in the
literature are organizational changes (eg, Lindbeck and Snower (1996) and Caroli and van Reenen (2001))
and globalisation of goods and labor markets (see, eg, Fenstra and Hanson (1996), Wood (1998), Baldwin
and Cain (2000), and Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1996)).
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Figure 2: Low-skilled Unemployment Rates in the U.S. and in Germany. Data sources
and definitions in Appendix A.2.
structure compressed so that skill-biased technological change has been leading to increas-
ing unemployment.2 The role of labor unions has obtained considerable attention (eg,
Lindbeck and Snower (2001)). Labor market institutions as the unemployment insurance
system and employment protection (eg, Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)), or minimum
wages (eg, Teulings (2003)) have also obtained attention in the literature. The major
theoretical drawback of the institutional approaches is that they can explain differences
in the level of unemployment and the level of wage dispersion, but they have difficulties
in explaining a widening gap of wage dispersion and unemployment as long as the in-
stitutions are unchanged.3. Our paper contributes to the view that it is the institutions
that matters for the diverging evolution between the U.S./UK and Continental Europe.
Unlike the other models of institutional differences, our model is able to reproduce the
differential dynamics of unemployment and wage inequality and not only levels. We argue
that in Europe, skill-biased technological change has adverse effects on employment of
unskilled workers because their wages are linked to the skilled workers’ wages. This link
is established by the indexation of social benefits to per-capita income.
Modern welfare states usually possess social protection systems including schemes that
provide needy people with subsistence benefits.4 Often, the level of benefits is linked to
2See, eg, Krugman (1994), Katz and Autor (1999), Blau and Kahn (1996), Freeman (1996), and Ace-
moglu (2002). Fewer authors argue that both, the stylized differences between the U.S. and Europe and
the labor market rigidities used to explain these differences are overstated in the above literature (see, eg,
Nickell (1997), Gregg and Manning (1997) and Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005)).
3Admittedly, it has been noted in the literature that institutions have changed in reaction to shocks,
such as skill-biased technical change. There has been a tendency towards deunionization in the U.S. and UK
while, at least in the beginning of the 80s in Continental Europe employment protection was strengthened
and benefits of the unemployment insurance have become more generous(see Blanchard (2005))
4Names for these schemes in the different countries are “social assistance benefit”, “welfare allowance”,
“right to the social integration”, “minimum income, public assistance”, “guaranteed minimum income
benefit”, “social benefit”, “subsistence allowance”, “social insertion income”, “benefit in material need”,
etc. In the remainder of the paper, we use the label “benefits” as an umbrella term for all these schemes.
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the evolution of wages or per-capita income. The reason for this is that benefits are paid
to avoid poverty so that their level must be closely related to the “subsistence level”. But
the subsistence level is a relative concept and so is poverty.5 In Germany, for example,
the subsistence level is defined in the social legislation (Bundessozialhilfegesetz §12 BSHG,
Sozialgesetzbuch §27 SGB XII). Both articles explicitly state that the subsistence level does
not only consist of sufficient food, housing, clothes, furniture, etc. but also of participation
in social and cultural life. Social contacts and participation in cultural life perhaps more
than food, housing, and the like depend on the average wealth of a society. In societies
where most of the people can afford video cameras, mobile phones, flights to distant
countries, etc., a life without electric light, running water or even without a television set
is considered unacceptable.6 Therefore benefits in general depend on the average wealth
of a society. The strength of this link, however, varies across countries. We find that
in most of Continental Europe the level of benefits is tied closely to per-capita income
while in the Anglo-Saxon countries the benefits level has been kept constant in real terms
and has not been adjusted to per-capita income over the last 20 years.7 We show that
this institutional difference is able to explain the transatlantic differences in wage and
employment dynamics.
Endogeneity of the level of benefits with respect to the average income is important
for labor market outcomes because it establishes a link from skilled workers’ productivi-
ties to unskilled workers’ wages: Changes in skilled workers productivities affect average
income and thereby the level of benefits. This increase in the fallback income improves
the bargaining position of the unskilled workers. In general this will result in higher wages
and—for lack of respective productivity gains—higher unemployment.8
To demonstrate the mechanisms, our baseline model considers a “European” economy
with skilled and unskilled labor. Following papers on related issues (see, eg, Davis (1998)
and Krugman (1995)), we assume that the market for skilled labor clears, while the market
for unskilled labor does not. This is justified by the fact that the unskilled workers are by
far more likely to be unemployed which is evident from Table 1.9 In the baseline model the
wage for unskilled labor is determined by a monopolistic labor union while employment
is determined by competitive firms.10 These assumptions are for simplicity. The focus
5See, eg, Foster (1998): “Absolute versus Relative Poverty” and the other contributions to the session
on “What is Poverty and Who are the Poor?” in the AEA Papers and Proceedings Issue of the American
Economic Review of May 1998.
6The German right-of-distraint legislation considers a television set as indispensable and excludes it
from seizure.
7Note, that in Germany the explicit link between pensions and benefits has been kept in the new social
legislation (the Hartz IV reform), for the so called Arbeitslosengeld II (§20 SGB II,(4)).
8In fact, most benefit systems have unemployment insurance elements that depend on the level of
past earnings rather than the general income level of the economy. But for two reasons, we think that
unemployment insurance is not the proper measure for the fallback income of workers:
1. Unemployment insurance benefits are generally limited in duration. After a certain time limit,
eligibility for unemployment insurance expires and unemployed workers receive social benefits. So,
in the long run, it is social benefits that constitute the fallback income.
2. For unskilled workers, unemployment insurance benefits may easily fall short of the level of social
benefits. In this case, the payment is increased to this level. So, the level of social benefits rather
than the level of unemployment insurance benefits constitutes the lower bound to unskill wages.
9Wages are generally less flexible at the lower end of the distribution. For Germany, for example,
Bu¨ttner and Fitzenberger (1998) (p. 1) find that “... employees with low wages have significantly lower
wage flexibility than high wage employees. This effect is particularly relevant for the lower educational
groups.”
10In Section 4, this assumption is relaxed in three ways. Subsection 4.1 shows that similar results
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Table 1: Unemployment Rates by Education, Euro-zone, Average: 1995 - 2004
Low Educationa Medium Educationb High Educationc
13.42% 9.38% 6.43%
Source: Eurostat; ISCED 1997 classification a) lower secondary education or less
(ISCED 0-2), b) upper secondary education, post-secondary, non-tertiary education
(ISCED 3-4), c) first or second stage tertiary education (ISCED 5-6).
of this paper is on the (strikingly large) extent to which the unskilled workers’ rate of
unemployment exceeds that of the skilled workers. The fact that unemployment also
exists among the skilled workers might indeed be explained by considerations of insider-
outsider relations, search frictions, efficiency wages, or the like. These theories might be
seen as complementary rather than contradictory to this paper.
The findings of the baseline model (and its generalizations) are consistent with the
evolution of wages and employment of unskilled workers in Europe over the past decades.
Wages for all skill levels have risen over this period and, by and large, the employment
prospects of the less skilled workers have deteriorated.11 There has been increasing con-
sensus among economists that asymmetric technological progress and possibly increasing
trade with low-wage countries have led to a substantial shift in demand away from un-
skilled workers toward skilled workers during the 1980’s and the 1990’s.12 In the United
States (and the UK), it seems, this demand shift has led to an increase in wage inequality
while in (Continental) Europe, where the wage structure has remained fairly stable, it re-
sulted in a rise in unemployment, in particular among unskilled workers (see, eg, Krugman
(1994), Freeman (1995), Siebert (1997), and Davis (1998)).13 This coincidence of rising
wage inequality in the United States and rising unemployment (at rather stable relative
wages) in Europe suggests that the kind of feedback mechanism described in the our base-
line model has been an important feature of labor markets in Continental Europe but not
in the U.S. and the UK. We show that, on the basis of only one institutional difference,
namely the link between benefits and per-capita income, we can explain this difference in
employment and wage dynamics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the question
are obtained when the wage is determined in negotiations between a labor union and firms, modeled as
the generalized Nash-Bargaining solution. Subsection 4.2 considers the case where the wages for both,
skilled and unskilled workers are determined by unions and unemployment occurs at both skill levels. In
Subsection 4.6, markets on all skill levels are assumed to be competitive.
All three modifications do not affect the results substantially.
11See, eg, Siebert (1997), Katz and Autor (1999), Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), Chapter 2.6, or Ace-
moglu (2002). For Germany a detailed analysis of the employment and wage development is performed in
Fitzenberger (1999).
12Levy and Murnane (1992) and Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) give surveys of the empirical literature
on this subject.
13We are aware that the view that increasing unemployment in Continental Europe and increasing wage
inequality in the U.S. and the UK are two sides of the same coin (namely skill-biased technological change)
is not beyond controversy (see, eg, Nickell and Bell (1996), Gregg and Manning (1997) and Krueger and
Pischke (1998)). Yet, there seems to have emerged a large consensus among many economists that this view
explains at least parts of the intercontinental differences (see, eg, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), Chapter
10 or Borjas (2005), Chapter 11). Empirical support is given by, eg, Puhani (2003). Muysken and Zwick
(2006) offer an interesting interpretation of the differences between the U.S. and Germany that is related
to training costs.
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whether and how tightly different countries link their benefit payments to the average
income for a selection of OECD countries. The model is set up in Section 3. Comparative
static results and the implications of our model with respect to the transatlantic differences
in the social legislation are discussed. Section 4 assesses the robustness of the results and
Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Transatlantic Differences in the Social Legislation
In this section we analyze the legal situation both in Continental Europe and in the U.S.
and the UK to demonstrate how benefits depend on per-capita income in different welfare
systems. We find that in the United States and the UK benefits have not been adjusted
to average income in the last 20 years, while in most European countries this adjustment
is automatic and by law. Having observed this, in the next section our model shows that
it is precisely this institutional difference that can account for diverging experiences in the
evolution of wage inequality and unemployment.
We are aware that this binary classification into European and Anglo-Saxon countries
is crude. There is substantial variation in the social legislation within these groups of
countries.14 But, when it comes to the evolution of benefits over time, the similarities
within and the disparities between these two groups of countries are striking: In most
European countries, these benefits depend on per-capita income by law, while this is not
the case in Anglo-Saxon countries.
Let us consider the European countries first. In some countries, the adjustment of the
benefits level over time is automatic by law, ie, there is a clear adjustment frequency and
there are clear rules to what the benefits level is to be adapted. In other countries the
legislation gives more scope to the government or the parliament to act and adjustments
are discretionary. In some countries where there exist rules for the adjustment of benefits,
the evolution of benefit payments is linked to the evolution of wages and/or income while
in others, benefits are linked to consumer prices. Figure 1 contains a synopsis of the social
legislation in a selection of countries. In most European countries (Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Portugal), welfare benefits are automatically
linked to the evolution of average wages, average income or public pensions (which on their
part are linked to the evolution of average wages or average income) by law. Exceptions
are Belgium, France, Greece and Spain. In Greece a general income support scheme does
not exist. We discuss the remaining three countries in Appendix A.1 and provide empirical
evidence that is in accordance with our main hypothesis.
In Anglo-Saxon countries, on the other hand, benefits are not linked to average wages
or income. In the UK, “income support” is tied to the evolution of consumer prices only.
15 In the U.S., the institutional and legal situation is more complex.16 At the federal
level, the Food Stamp Program is the only program in the overall social safety net that
14There have been several attempts in the European Union to harmonize social legislation - without
much success, though. Two of the more successful attempts have led to the European Social Charter of
1989 and to the social protocol annexed to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 - both not signed by the United
Kingdom. If compared to other policy areas of the European Community, the treaties on social standards
remain vague.
15There were no additional discretionary increases between 1979 and 2001 (see Cantillon, van Mechelen,
Marx, and van den Bosch (2004) and Goodman and Shephard (2002).
16For a concise overview, see Uccello and Gallagher (1997) from where most of the following information
is taken.
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is not restricted to certain eligibility groups. The maximum amount of food stamps that
an entitled person can get is indexed to the costs of the Thrifty Food Plan, a nutritious
low-cost diet (see Gundersen, LeBlanc, and Kuhn (1999), page 3). In addition, there exist
special schemes for special groups: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
provides cash payments primarily to poor single mothers. Not eligible are for example
poor families with employed principal wage earners (even if they were financially eligible).
The program has been replaced in 1996 by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) which is more restrictive in terms of duration and eligibility. The amounts granted
to families have been adjusted only infrequently and very little. Between 1970 and 1993,
for example, payments to a family of three have dropped by nearly 45% in real terms
(see Gundersen, LeBlanc, and Kuhn (1999)). The Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
is designed to help aged, blind, and disabled people, who have little or no income. The
level of these payments is indexed to the COLA-Index (“Cost of Living Adjustments”).17
Finally, Medicaid provides medical assistance to poor persons, but eligibility is generally
tied to eligibility for SSI or AFDC.
On the state level, the General Assistance (GA) provides income support to those
poor persons who are not eligible for federal programs. Despite the common name, there
is great variation across states with respect to availability, eligibility, form of benefits
(cash vs. vendor payments/vouchers), duration, and the level of benefits. The program
is not very generous. In all states but Nebraska, the maximum cash benefits are below
the federal poverty threshold for 1995 published by the Bureau of the Census ($7,763 for
one person).18 Adjustments are rare and very low. “Eight states have enacted nominal
benefit increases since 1992, but none of these have exceeded the rate of inflation. Thus,
real benefit levels have remained stagnant or fallen. Six states have actually reduced
nominal benefits.” (Uccello and Gallagher (1997), p.5)
In summary, we can conclude, that none of the U.S. income support programs links
benefits to the evolution of average income or wages. In fact, in many cases, amounts are
not even adjusted for inflation.
Figure 1 in the appendix summarizes the institutional setting. It shows that welfare
benefits are linked to average wages or income by law in most of Continental Europe but
not in the U.S. and the UK. In Appendix A.1, we take a closer look at those European
countries, that have no legal automatic link between benefits and wages or income and
provide empirical evidence that is in accordance with our assumptions. The next section
containing the baseline version of our model demonstrates that this institutional difference
in the determination of benefits can account for diverging experiences in the evolution of
employment and inequality.
3 The Model
3.1 The Baseline Case: Europe
Consider an economy with a continuum of mass 1 of homogeneous firms on an interval
[0, 1] producing a single good. The good is produced using two input factors, unskilled
17The adjustment to the cost of living index is automatic and based on the CPI-W, the consumer price
index for urban wage earners and clerical workers. In the period between 1975 and 2005, there is only
one change that is above the COLA (in 1983), a legislated increase which corresponds to changes in the
taxation of social benefits.
18The average percentage is 39%. Missouri pays the lowest amounts (12%).
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and skilled labor. There is a mass 1 of workers of each type. Each worker supplies one
unit of labor. For simplicity, the model is essentially static. There is no capital in the
model so that consumption equals production at any point in time.19
Technology The firm produces according to the production function
Y = (au · lu)ρ + (as · ls)ρ , 0 < ρ < 1, 0 < au < as, (1)
where Y is the quantity of the final good, lu and ls are the levels of employment of
unskilled and skilled labor respectively, and ρ, au, and as are productivity parameters.
This specification has the following properties:
• The elasticity of substitution between unskilled and skilled labor is σ = 1/ (1− ρ) >
1. We restrict the analysis to substitution elasticities larger than one because only
in this case does skill-biased technological change have adverse effects on the rela-
tive position of the unskilled workers. Furthermore, the majority of the empirical
estimates are between 1 and 2. See, eg, Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) who argue
that a consensus estimate is a value around 1.5.
• The marginal productivities of unskilled and skilled workers are independent of each
other and the cross wage elasticities of the factor demands are zero. We make
this arguably strong assumption to guarantee that any relation between the wages
for the two kinds of labor that arises in the model can be attributed solely to the
institutional peculiarities.
These restrictions are also for simplicity. In Subsection 4.3, we consider the case of a
more general CES (constant elasticity of substitution) technology. The results are shown
to be independent of these different specifications.
Demand for Unskilled and Skilled Labor Firms sell their products on the world
market at the world market price P = 1 (by choice of the nume´raire). At given wage
levels, firms choose the level of employment so as to maximize their profit
pi = Y − wu · lu − ws · ls. (2)
The demand for unskilled and skilled labor is respectively
ldu (wu) =
(
ρ · aρu
wu
) 1
1−ρ
and lds (ws) =
(
ρ · aρs
ws
) 1
1−ρ
, (3)
where wu and ws are the wages for unskilled and skilled labor respectively.
Benefits The model involves unemployment of unskilled workers. All unemployed in-
dividuals are assumed to receive benefits, w˜. In accordance with the reasoning in the
introduction, the benefits are assumed to depend on the net average income
w˜ = µ · (1− t) · Y
2
(4)
19This allows us to focus on differences in employment and inequality that do not stem from different
capital-labor ratios, as, eg, in Beaudry and Green (2003).
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where Y/2 is the per-capita income, t is the income tax rate, and µ ∈ [0, 1] is a propor-
tionality factor. The benefits are financed through a proportional income tax. The tax
rate t is endogenously determined by the government’s budget constraint:
(1− lu) · w˜ = t · Y (5)
The Union’s Objective Function All unskilled workers are assumed to be members
of a labor union. The union chooses the wage to maximize the expected labor income of
its members.
U = E [net labor income|wu] = lu (wu) · (1− t) · wu + [1− lu (wu)] · w˜ (6)
The first term in expression (6) represents the probability for any union member to become
(or remain) employed (conditional on the wage level) times the net wage of employed
unskilled workers. The second term represents the conditional probability to become
unemployed times the alternative income (ie, benefits).
Wage Determination The wage for unskilled labor is assumed to be determined by a
monopolistic labor union whereas the firm has the “right to manage”. The union maxi-
mizes its objective function taking into account the effect of the wage level on employment.
We assume that, out of idleness or lack of comprehension of the economic system, the union
does not consider the second-round effects the wage has on the level of benefits and on the
tax rate.20 In the formal model, this means that the objective function (6) is maximized
subject to (3) but taking the level of benefits w˜ and the tax rate t as exogenously given.
Solving the maximization problem yields the following result which is familiar from the
literature.21
Lemma 1 Under the above assumptions, the wage for unskilled labor, wu, is an increasing
function of the level of benefits, w˜ :
wu =
w˜
ρ · (1− t) . (7)
The Interdependence of Wages and Benefits In contrast to standard union models
(and in contrast to what the union takes into account), in this model, the level of benefits is
a function of the net average income which, in turn, is a function of the wage for unskilled
labor. Accounting for this endogeneity in (7) yields22
w∗u =
1
2
· µ
ρ
·
[(
ρ · au
w∗u
) ρ
1−ρ
+ aρs
]
. (8)
20This assumption is also for simplicity. In Subsection 4.1, we consider the case where the union takes
into full account the effects of the wage level on the level of benefits and the tax rate. The results are
virtually unaffected.
21See, eg, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), Chapter 7, Muthoo (1999), Chapter 2.5, or Borjas (2005),
Chapter 13.
22Equations (7) and (8) are two different ways of writing down the same result. In equation (7) the
focus is on the dependency of the unskilled workers’ wage on the level of (endogenous) benefits while in
equation (8) the unskilled workers’ wage is shown as a function of the exogenous parameters of the model.
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The equilibrium wage for unskilled labor, w∗u, is implicitly given by this equation.23 It is
easily verified that under the above assumptions, an equilibrium, w∗u (au, as, µ, ρ), exists
and is unique.24
3.2 Comparative Statics
The comparative static properties of the equilibrium allocation are presented in the fol-
lowing propositions:
Proposition 1 An increase [respectively decrease] in the unskilled workers’ productivity,
as measured by the productivity parameter au, leads to an increase [respectively decrease]
in both, the equilibrium wage and the level of employment of unskilled labor.
∂w∗u
∂au
· au
w∗u
=
ηY,lu
1− ρ+ ηY,lu
> 0 (9)
∂l∗u
∂au
· au
l∗u
=
ρ− ηY,lu
1− ρ+ ηY,lu
> 0 (10)
where ηY,li =
∂Y
∂lu
· luY .
A decrease in the unskilled workers’ productivity leads—via a decrease in the average
income—to a decrease in the unskilled workers’ wage. But this decrease is less than would
be required by the productivity loss because the wage is linked to the average income level
which decreases by less than the unskilled workers productivity. Therefore unemployment
of the unskilled increases. This failure of the wage to fully adjust to changes in productivity
can be seen as a rigidity in the relative wage wu/ws.
While the wage for skilled labor always adjusts to clear the market, the wage for
unskilled labor depends on the productivities of both, unskilled and skilled workers. In
other words, the wage for unskilled labor is linked to the wage for skilled labor. The
relative wage cannot fully adjust to changes in the relative productivity. This rigidity
leads to an increase in unemployment in response to a decrease in the productivity for
the unskilled workers. Similar results are obtained in standard union models where the
reservation wage of the workers is exogenous.
Proposition 2 An increase [respectively decrease] in the skilled workers’ productivity, as
measured by the productivity parameter as, leads to an increase [respectively decrease] in
the wage for unskilled labor and a decrease [respectively increase] in the level of employment
for unskilled workers.
∂w∗u
∂as
· as
w∗u
=
(1− ρ) · ηY,ls
1− ρ+ ηY,lu
> 0 (11)
∂l∗u
∂as
· as
l∗u
= − ηY,ls
1− ρ+ ηY,lu
< 0 (12)
23Throughout the paper, the term “equilibrium” will be used to refer to the allocation which results
from union wage setting, given the other institutional features of the model.
24Existence: For wu sufficiently small (resp. sufficiently large), the right hand side of the equilibrium
condition (8) is larger (resp. smaller) than the left hand side. As both sides of the equation are continuous
in wu there must exist at least one value of wu, w
∗
u, for which both sides are equal. Uniqueness: The
left hand side of (8) is strictly increasing in wu whereas the right hand side is strictly decreasing in wu.
Therefore, if a solution to (8), w∗u, exists, it must be unique.
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The increased productivity of the skilled workers leads to a rise in the average income.
This in turn increases—through higher benefits—the unskilled workers’ reservation wage
and thereby their wage. Since the productivity of the unskilled workers remains unchanged,
unemployment increases.
While the result in Proposition 1—that the wage falls too little in response to a fall
in the productivity of the unskilled—is also obtained in standard union models, the result
in Proposition 2—that the wage increases too much in response to a productivity gain of
the skilled workers—is unique to this model where the feedback mechanism from income
levels to wages is accounted for. In this model, the driving force behind both effects is the
above mentioned rigidity in the relative wage.
Propositions 1 and 2 consider cases where only one type of labor becomes more produc-
tive. Depending on whose productivity increases, unemployment increases or decreases.
Since in reality, technological change tends to affect the productivities of different types
of labor at the same time, the question naturally arises which of the two opposite effects
dominates. The following Proposition answers this question.
Proposition 3 Technological change leads to a decrease [respectively increase] in employ-
ment of the unskilled and an increase [decrease] in wage inequality whenever it leads to an
increase [decrease] in asau .
∂l∗u
∂ asau
·
as
au
l∗u
= − ηY,ls
1− ρ+ ηY,lu
< 0 (13)
∂(wswu )
∗
∂ asau
·
as
au
(wswu )
∗ =
ρ ·
( ws
wu
as
au
) ρ
1−ρ
1− ρ+
( ws
wu
as
au
) ρ
1−ρ
> 0 (14)
Skill-biased technological progress favoring the skilled workers’ productivity in a way
that leads to an increase in as/au has a negative effect on the relative demand for unskilled
labor, ldu/l
d
s . Since the relative wage for unskilled labor, wu/ws, cannot fully adjust to this
shift in labor demand, unemployment of unskilled workers increases.25 On the other hand,
if the productivity of unskilled workers grows faster [or falls more slowly] than the skilled
workers’ productivity, the wage for unskilled labor increases [respectively falls], but by less
[respectively more] than would be justified by the shift in the relative productivity so that
the employment of unskilled workers increases. Any technological change that leaves the
ratio as/au unaffected has no effect on the level of employment.
This result is consistent with the view that it is the same factors that boost wage
inequality in the U.S. and the UK and result in higher unemployment in Continental
Europe. In a model in which the welfare system is less generous and wages are to a
greater extent market-determined—the alleged features of U.S. and UK labor markets—
skill-biased technological change (in the form of an increase in as/au) leads to a stronger
increase in wage inequality while unemployment is affected less or not all. Appendix A
provides detailed empirical evidence for this result.
25It is easily verified that
∂( ws
wu
)∗
∂ as
au
·
as
au
( ws
wu
)∗ = ρ ·
(
ws
wu
as
au
) ρ
1−ρ
/(
1− ρ+
(
ws
wu
as
au
) ρ
1−ρ
)
is unambiguously
smaller than ρ, the respective elasticity that prevailed if wages were perfectly flexible.
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Increasing trade with and outsourcing to low-wage countries have been cited as a
second culprit of the rise in wage inequality in the United States.26 In fact, in a two-sector
version of this model, it can be shown that increasing trade with low-wage countries (as
modeled by a decrease in the relative price of the import good—whose production is
assumed to be intensive in the use of unskilled labor) has exactly the same effect on wages
and employment as skill-biased technological change (as modeled by an increase in as/au).
Increasing trade with low-wage countries also leads to a (downward) shift in the relative
demand for unskilled labor. As the relative wage for unskilled labor does not fully adjust,
unemployment of unskilled labor rises.
3.3 Wage and Employment Dynamics: Anglo-Saxony vs. Continental
Europe
In this section, we explore the implications of our model for the differences in wage and
employment dynamics between Anglo-Saxon countries (AS) and Continental European
countries (EU). For ease of presentation, we denote asau ≡ α and wswu ≡ ω and normalize
the productivity parameter of unskilled labor to 1. The technology is thus given by
Y = lρu + (α · ls)ρ. Benefits are given by
w˜ = µ ·
(
(1− t) ·
(
Y
2
))ξ
(15)
where ξ = 1 in Europe and ξ = 0 in Anglo-Saxon countries. As expounded in Section 2,
benefits are tied to the evolution of average income in Europe, but not in the U.S. and
the UK.
In both regimes, the wages for unskilled and skilled labor are given by wu = w˜ρ·(1−t)
and ws = ρ · αρ. Taking into account the differences in the determination of benefits the
relative wage for skilled labor is given by
ωEU =
2(
ωEU
α
) ρ
1−ρ + 1
· ρ
2
µ
and ωAS = αρ · ρ
2
µ
(16)
in European and Anglo-Saxon countries respectively. The effect of skill-biased technolog-
ical change on wage inequality is given by(
∂ω
∂α
· α
ω
)
EU
=
ρ · (ωα) ρ1−ρ
1− ρ+ (ωα) ρ1−ρ and
(
∂ω
∂α
· α
ω
)
AS
= ρ (17)
It is easily shown that
(
∂ω
∂α · αω
)
EU
<
(
∂ω
∂α · αω
)
AS
as long as ρ < 1. The effect of skill-biased
technological change on wage inequality is smaller in European countries, where the linkage
of benefits to the evolution of average income keeps the wage distribution compressed.
The effects of skill-biased technological change on unemployment in European countries
have been discussed in Subsection 3.2. In the Anglo-Saxon regime, employment of unskilled
workers is given by lu (wu) =
(
ρ
wu
) 1
1−ρ =
(
ρ2
µ
) 1
1−ρ . Thus (un-)employment does not
depend on the relative productivity parameter α. In summary, skill-biased technological
change leads to an increase in unemployment in European countries and has no effect on
unemployment in Anglo-Saxon countries:(
∂lu
∂α
· α
lu
)
EU
= − ηY,ls
1− ρ+ ηY,lu
< 0 and
(
∂lu
∂α
· α
lu
)
AS
= 0 (18)
26See, eg, Fenstra and Hanson (1996), Wood (1998) and more recently Baldwin and Cain (2000).
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We end this section by noting that a difference in bargaining power on the side of
labor unions does not suffice to explain the differential unemployment and wage inequality
dynamics between the two sets of countries in the presence of skill-biased technological
change. If as in the model AS, the outside option does not react in response to an increasing
demand for high-skilled labor, unemployment is unchanged irrespectively of the market
power of labor unions. An explanation of the transatlantic difference that is linked to the
bargaining power of labor unions requires a change in the bargaining power. In our model,
it is the interaction of an increasing outside option and (an unchanged) bargaining power
of the workers which cause the unemployment to increase. Of course, we do not negate the
importance of the observed deunionization in the U.S. and UK (see, eg, Blanchflower and
Bryson (2004)) and see our paper as complementary to studies that link the transatlantic
differences to a change in bargaining power.
4 Robustness Considerations
In this section, some critical assumptions of the model are relaxed or modified. The
robustness of the results of the baseline model with respect to these modifications is
assessed.
4.1 Generalized Nash-Bargaining, Risk Aversion, Rational Expectations
In this subsection, we alter the following assumptions:
• The wage is not set unilaterally by the union. It is modeled as the result of a Nash
bargain between the union and the firms.
• Workers are assumed to derive decreasing marginal utility from wage income. The
union’s objective function is the expected utility of its members conditional on the
wage level: U = E [u (net labor income) |wu] = lu (wu)·u [(1− t) · wu]+[1− lu (wu)]·
u (w˜), where u (•) = ln (•).27
• The union and the firms take into full account the effects of the wage-setting on the
level of benefits and the tax rate.
The outcome of the bargain is modeled as the Nash bargaining solution:
wu = argmax
wu
{U − U0}λ · {pi − pi0}1−λ , λ ∈ [0, 1] , (19)
where U is the union’s objective function as given in (6) and U0 is the union’s disagreement
point, pi and pi0 are the firm’s profit and disagreement point, and λ measures the union’s
relative bargaining power. The union’s disagreement point in the bargain, U0, is given by
the value of its objective function when the negotiation fails and all unskilled workers are
unemployed,
U0 = ln w˜. (20)
27As an anonymous referee pointed out, decreasing marginal utility implies the desire for consumption
smoothing over time. For simplicity we assume, that saving is not possible. The produced good must be
consumed immediately. It cannot be accumulated in the form of capital.
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The firm’s disagreement point is given by the level of its profit when the negotiation on
the wage for unskilled labor fails and only skilled workers are employed,
pi0 = (as · ls)ρ − ws · ls. (21)
In this setting, the equilibrium wage for unskilled labor is given by:
wu =
1
2
· e λλ+ρ·(1−λ) ·(φ·ηY,lu+1−ρ) · µ · Y, with ηY,lu =
∂Y
∂lu
· lu
Y
where φ ∈ {0, 1} is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the second round effects
of the wage for unskilled labor on the level of benefits and the tax rate are accounted for
in the wage bargain.28 Qualitatively, the results of Propositions 1 through 3 remain valid
in this setting. For details see Appendix B.1.
Similar results are obtained if the workers’ utilities depend not just on their own income
but considerations of envy or fairness introduce a preference for relative wealth.29
4.2 Unemployment at the Unskilled and the Skilled Level
In the baseline model, we restricted unemployment to the unskilled level. This simplifi-
cation was justified by the low unemployment rates for skilled workers (see Table 1). In
this subsection we show that the results are robust with respect to this simplification. We
assume that both types of labor are represented by a union. The wages are determined in
negotiations between the union and firms. The outcome of the negotiation is modeled as
the Nash bargaining solution:
wi = argmax
wi
{Ui − Ui,0}λ · {pi − pii,0}1−λ , i ∈ {u, s}
where pi is given by (2) and
Ui = li (wi) · (1− t) · wi + [1− li (wi)] · w˜, Ui,0 = w˜
pii,0 = (aj · lj)ρ − wj · lj , i, j ∈ {u, s} , j 6= i
In this specification, the resulting wages are
w∗i = ρ
2ρ−1aρi
(
µ
ρ+ (1− ρ)λi
2
[(
ρ+ (1− ρ)λi
ρ+ (1− ρ)λj
aj
ai
) ρ
1−ρ
+ 1
])1−ρ
, i, j ∈ {u, s} , i 6= j
As in the baseline model, the wage for unskilled labor increases with the productivity of
skilled workers. In addition, in this setting, the skilled workers’ wage also increases with
the unskilled workers’ productivity.
28With λ = 1 (monopoly union) and φ = 0 (incomplete backward induction) as in Sections 3.1 through
3.2, this implies wu =
1
2
· e1−ρ · µ ·
[(
ρ·au
w∗u
) ρ
1−ρ
+ aρs
]
which is very similar to the result in equation (8).
The slight difference (e1−ρ instead of 1
ρ
) is due to the fact that in Subsections 3.1 through 3.2 the union
is assumed to maximize expected net labor income whereas in this subsection, the union is assumed to
maximize expected utility from net labor income.
29See, eg, Veblen (1899) (p. 31): “The end sought by accumulation is to rank high in comparison with
the rest of the community in point of pecuniary strength.”
The role of social status is also stressed in Weiss and Fershtman (1998) (p. 810): “... ‘guest workers’ and
immigrants are less reluctant to accept low status work, partially because they do not compare themselves
with local workers. In addition, it is considered less ‘unfair’ to pay them low wages, given the low wage in
their country of origin.”
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Consequently, employment of unskilled labor depends on the productivity of skilled
labor:
l∗i =
(
ρ2
µ
2
(ρ+ (1− ρ)λi)
[
1 +
(
ρ+ (1− ρ)λi
ρ+ (1− ρ)λj
aj
ai
) ρ
1−ρ
])−1
, i, j ∈ {u, s} , i 6= j
The results from Propositions 1 through 3 remain valid, ie:
∂w∗i
∂ai
ai
w∗i
> 0,
∂l∗i
∂ai
ai
l∗i
> 0,
∂w∗i
∂aj
aj
w∗i
> 0,
∂l∗i
∂aj
aj
l∗i
< 0,
∂l∗i
∂
aj
ai
aj
ai
l∗i
< 0, i, j ∈ {u, s} , i 6= j
4.3 CES Technology
In Subsections 3.1 through 3.2, the technology is separable in the two types of labor. In
this section, we consider a more general CES technology:
Y = [(au · lu)ρ + (as · ls)ρ]
β
ρ ,
where ρ < 1 determines the elasticity of substitution σ = 1/ (1− ρ) and β ∈ [0, 1] is
a returns-to-scale parameter. This specification nests the usual constant-returns-to-scale
case (β = 1) and the specification from the previous sections (β = ρ). Under these
assumptions, the equilibrium wage for unskilled labor is given by
wu =
1
2
· e−
1
ηlu,wu · µ · Y,
where ηlu,wu =
∂lu
∂wu
· wulu . In Appendix B.2 it is shown that skill-biased technological change
has the respective employment effects:30
∂ (1− l∗u)
∂ (as/au)
T 0 ⇔ σ T 1
4.4 Benefits as a Function of the Average Wage
The central assumption of the baseline model is that benefits or, more generally, the
reservation wage of unskilled workers depend on average income (see equation 4). In some
countries, however, benefits are indexed to the evolution of average wages (see Appendix
A.1). In addition, since other workers’ wages can be observed more easily than their total
income, it might be argued that the workers’ reservation wage should be a function of the
average wage level rather than the average income level. This reasoning takes into account
the argument that workers compare their wages with the wages of the other workers as,
eg, stated in the “fair wage-effort hypothesis” by Akerlof and Yellen (1990). They argue
that what a worker considers her “fair wage” also depends on the wages of other workers,
irrespective of their qualification.31 In the model, this means that equation (4) is replaced
by w˜ = µ · (1− t) · wu·lu+ws·ls2 . If the reservation wage depends on average wage the results
from Sections 3.1 and 3.2 hold similarly: The existence of a unique equilibrium as well as
the comparative static results from Propositions 1 through 3 remain valid.
30The sign of the effect depends on the elasticity of substitution between unskilled and skilled labor. The
same condition applies for the respective effects of skill-biased technological change on wage inequality in
the case where wages are flexible: ws
wu
= ∂Y/∂ls
∂Y/∂lu
=
(
as
au
)ρ
.
∂ ws
wu
∂ as
au
= ρ · ( as
au
)ρ−1 T 0 ⇔ σ T 1. See, eg,
Acemoglu (2002) for a discussion of this issue.
31See also footnote 29.
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4.5 Is the Reservation Wage a Function of the Level of Benefits? Are
the Benefits a Function of the Average Standard of Living?
Two assumptions concerning the reservation wage’s dependence on the average standard
of living are made in Subsection 3.1. These are (i) that the reservation wage is equal to
the level of benefits and (ii) that the level of benefits is a function of the average standard
of living. One might consider either of them as a strong assumption. But, as long as the
wage for unskilled labor depends positively on some measure of a reservation wage/fallback
income that in turn is positively influenced by the average standard of living, the main
conclusions remain valid. w˜ can be interpreted as any measure of the reservation wage
that depends on the average standard of living. In fact, minimum wages are often indexed
on the average wage. For example, in France, Japan, and Spain, the legal minimum wage
is explicitly indexed to the average wage (see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), page 715).
If—in addition—the minimum wage is binding, the same feedback effects are induced.
4.6 Competitive Market for Unskilled Labor
Most of the previous subsections relied on the assumption that the wage for unskilled labor
is set by a labor union while the wage for skilled labor is flexible and clears the market.
In some European countries, however, wages at the very bottom of the wage distribution
are not covered by unions and it has been argued that the market for unskilled labor is
rather competitive (see Saint-Paul (1997)). In this section, we argue that our results are
robust with respect to these considerations.
Consider the following modified version of the economy in Subsection 3.1. Assume
that the workforce consists of a continuum of mass 1 of heterogeneous workers indexed by
skill-level i ∈ [0, 1]. The technology of the firm is Y = ∫ 10 ai · lρi ·di ,where li is employment
of workers of skill type i. Assume that wages for all skills be perfectly flexible so that
labor markets at all skill levels clear. Assume further—as in Subsection 3.1—that each
worker inelastically supplies one unit of labor whenever the prospective wage exceeds the
level of welfare aid. Equilibrium wages are given by wi = ∂Y∂li = ρ · ai .32
Assume that, in order to guarantee the subsistence level, the government pays social
benefits to those workers whose wage is below a certain threshold. These benefits are
financed by an income tax. Following the considerations in the introduction, the sub-
sistence level is a relative concept and so benefits depend on the average income level
w˜ = µ · y¯ = µ · ∫ 1j ai·di , where j is the marginal worker (or skill type) whose marginal
productivity is exactly equal to the level of benefits. For workers with types higher than
j, working pays. Workers with types lower than j prefer to receive social benefits. j is the
marginal worker who is indifferent between working and unemployment. j is implicitly
given by wj = aj · ρ != w˜ = µ ·
∫ 1
j ai·di .
Assume for simplicity that ai be uniformly distributed over the interval [a¯
, a¯].33 The
marginal worker is then determined by
j =
ρ ·
(
1− a¯a
¯
)
− µ+
√
ρ2 ·
(
1− 2 · a¯a
¯
)
+ (ρ2 + µ2) ·
(
a¯
a
¯
)2
µ ·
(
a¯
a
¯
− 1
) .
32Again, the final good is chosen as nume´raire.
33The productivity level of a type i worker is then given by ai = a
¯
+ (a¯− a
¯
) · i.
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From the definition of j follows that j is equal to the rate of unemployment.34 As in
Subsection 3.2, we now analyze the effects of technological progress on the level of unem-
ployment. Technological progress affects the productivities of the workers. The (uniform)
distribution of skills is determined by the upper and lower bounds a¯ and a
¯
. A proportion-
ate increase in both implies that the productivities of all workers increase at the same rate.
A more than proportionate increase of the upper bound a¯ relative to the lower bound a
¯
(ie,
an increase in a¯/a
¯
) implies that productivities of workers with higher skills increase faster
than productivities of workers with lower skills (ie, ai/ai′ increases for any pair i > i′).
It is straightforward to show that unemployment decreases with an increase in a
¯
(this
is the equivalent to Proposition 1) and increases with an increase in a¯ (this is the analogue
to Proposition 2). More generally, unemployment increases if and only if a¯/a
¯
increases.
This finding corresponds directly to the result in Proposition 3. Thus, as in Subsection 3.2,
whenever technological progress is skill-biased, favoring the productivities of the relatively
more skilled, unemployment increases.
This illustrates that the results obtained in Subsection 3.2 do not depend on the
specification of the wage determination. In fact, even with perfectly competitive labor
markets, (voluntary) unemployment can increase in the face of technological change. All
that is required is that the worker’s reservation wage is linked to the average income level
and that technological change is skill-biased.35
5 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we study the effects of skill-biased technological change on unemployment
and wage inequality when benefits are linked to per-capita income. This link to per-capita
income introduces a tie between the wages for different skills.
In standard models of union wage setting, wages—especially at the lower end of the
wage distribution—depend on the level of unemployment or social security benefits (which
constitute the workers’ reservation wage). As a consequence, these wages are downwardly
rigid. This rigidity causes unemployment when productivity falls and wages do not adjust
sufficiently. In our paper, benefits are endogenous and depend on wages. The interde-
pendence between wages and benefits yields an allocation where the wage for unskilled
labor depends positively on the wage for skilled labor. The obtained wage rigidity is a
rigidity in the relation between the wages for unskilled and skilled labor. The wage for
unskilled labor is too rigid with respect to the unskilled workers’ productivity and it is
overly sensitive to changes in the skilled workers’ productivity.
If—as a result of skill-biased technological change—the productivity of the skilled
workers rises faster than that of the unskilled workers, the wage of the latter increases by
more than would be justified by their productivity gains because it is linked to the skilled
workers’ wage via the benefits. As a result, unemployment of unskilled labor increases.
The matter of concern here is not that the unskilled workers’ wage falls too little—as in
34To be exact, the rate of unemployment is u = max {0, j} . If j is negative, even the least skilled worker
prefers to work and there is no unemployment. The condition for unemployment in this setting is: j > 0
⇔ µ > 2 · ρ
/(
a¯
a
¯
+ 1
)
. Unemployment occurs only if the replacement rate of unemployment benefits is
sufficiently high relative to the productivity parameters.
35This example might be a better model for some European labor markets where wages at the lower
end of the wage distribution are not covered by union wage bargaining but—contrary to anglo-saxon
economies—the social security system is rather generous.
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standard union models—but that it rises too much.
The findings of this paper are consistent with the evolution of wages and employment
of unskilled workers in Europe over the past decades. Wages for all skill levels have risen
over this period and, by and large, the employment prospects of the less skilled workers
have deteriorated.
Comparing the social legislation in the U.S. and many European countries, we find
that benefits are linked to the evolution of average income or wages in Continental Europe
but not in the U.S. and the UK. Given this institutional difference, our model predicts
that skill-biased technological change leads to rising unemployment in Continental Europe
and rising wage dispersion in the U.S. and the UK.
We can deduce interesting policy implications from the model. Any increase in the
relative productivity (or more generally in the relative “market value”) of skilled workers
leads to a higher rate of unemployment the European model—even if the absolute produc-
tivity of unskilled workers increases as well, but less than proportionately. From the point
of view of the model, we can blame two factors for the high unemployment of the unskilled.
First, benefits are tied to the average income and second, benefits are a determinant of the
wage of the unskilled. So, any policy measure that aims at weakening either of these links
will decrease unemployment. It is to be noted, however, that our model does not alter a
principal insight in the literature, namely the tradeoff between wage inequality and unem-
ployment. A decrease in unemployment would come at the cost of higher wage inequality.
There might be possibilities, however, to overcome this dilemma. One way might be the
introduction of a negative income tax. Such a tax scheme allows the uncoupling of gross
from net wages. Gross wages (and thus wage costs for firms) are determined by market
forces and reflect productivities and at the same time, inequality in net wages can be kept
from growing. These wage subsidies to unskilled workers would have to be financed of
course, but as these workers would not earn benefits anymore, the government’s budget
might even be relieved.
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Appendix
A Empirical Evidence
A.1 The Link Between Benefits and Per-Capita Income
To confirm our main hypothesis, in Section 2 we look at the legislation of 14 countries (see
Figure 1). For 10 countries the legal situation is clear and confirms our crude classifica-
tion in “European” and “Anglo-Saxon” countries. In three “European” countries Belgium,
France, and Spain, benefits are not linked automatically to the average income or wages.
Partly the law itself envisions that there are additional discrete adjustments. This is the
case for example in Belgium. There, the law explicitly allows the king to adjust the benefit
payments to the development of the living standards. As the legal situation allows these
countries to be “European” and “Anglo-Saxon”, we choose an empirical assessment to un-
cover the connection between average wages and benefit levels. For various reasons direct
data on benefit levels are not available: In general, benefit payments depend on individual
characteristics (wealth, income, household size, etc.) and differ across regions. Further-
more, in-kind transfers often make up an important part of total benefits. Therefore, we
use data on (real) social expenditures on unemployment per unemployed from the OECD
to approximate the benefit payments. We take the social expenditures on unemployment
as a proxy for expenditures on benefits and take the number of unemployed individuals
(from the OECD) as a proxy for the number of benefit recipients.36 Table 2 reports results
from regressions of changes in real social expenditures on unemployment per unemployed
on real GDP per capita changes.37 The influence is significant and roughly of the same
magnitude for all three countries.38 The purpose of these regressions is modest, however:
We use the best information we could assemble and get results that are at least consistent
with our classification.
In summary, we conclude that there is a positive relationship between our proxy for
benefits and average income in the three “European” countries, where the legal situation
is not unique.
As very briefly discussed in Subsection 4.5, a minimum wage that depends on average
wages has a similar effect as benefits that depend on average wages. This is the case in
France and Spain, where the minimum wage is tied to average income by law. So, for
these two countries there is an additional link between the wage of the unskilled and the
wage of high-skilled, even when, as in France, the benefits are not tied to the average
36We use social expenditures on unemployment, since a category for benefits alone does not exist so
that this category comes closest to our needs. Using in addition social expenditures on housing and
incapacity-related benefits does not change the principal conclusions. Results are available upon request.
37It is likely that both real GDP per capita and real social expenditures per unemployed are trended.
We use first differences in order not to run into the problem of a spurious regression.
38To assess the quality of our proxy social expenditures for unemployment per unemployed, we run the
same regression for Germany, the U.S., and the UK where we know the administrative rules. As expected
for Germany we get the significantly positive influence while for the U.S and the UK we do not. In addition,
we perform the above regressions for the other countries. Most results are as we expect. However, one
permanent exception is Italy which does not seem to be a “European” country and where the effect is
almost always negative and often even significant.
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Figure 3: Social Security in “Anglo-Saxon” and in “European” Countries
Source: Cantillon, van Mechelen, Marx, and van den Bosch (2004) and MISSOC (Mu-
tual Information System on Social Protection in the EU Member States and the EEA):
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment social/social protection/index en.html.
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Table 2: Relationship between real GDP per capita and real social expenditures on un-
employment per unemployed, 1980-2001
Dependent Variable: Real Social Expenditures per Unemployed
Belgium France Spain
Real GDP per Capita 0.955 1.265 1.219
(0.435) (0.419) (0.592)
All variables in first differences and national currency.
Standard errors in parentheses.
income by law. A minimum wage that is tied to average income also induces adverse
employment effects of skill-biased technological change. Again, for the U.S. and the UK
this link does not exist. In the U.S., the minimum wage has not even been adjusted to
consumer prices. In 2000 the minimum wage was 25% lower in real terms than in 1978
(see Card and DiNardo (2002), Figure 22). In the UK, a national minimum wage has
only been introduced in 1999 and can therefore not account for changes in inequality and
employment in the 1980s and 90s.
A.2 Descriptive Evidence to Proposition 3
Proposition 3 states that skill-biased technological change leads to rising wage inequality
and rising unemployment in European countries because the relative wage cannot fully
adjust to changes in relative labor demand. Put differently: If the wage dispersion in
Europe rises, it does not rise enough and unemployment rises as well. The unemployment
rate should thus be positively correlated with the skill-premium in Europe. A regression
of the unemployment rate of the unskilled individuals, uu,t, on the skill premium for
Germany, 1975 - 2004 yields:
ûu,t = −162.133
(33.884)
+ 82.171
(15.722)
· ws,t
wu,t
(
R2 = 0.4938
)
where standard errors are given in parentheses.39 This substantiates the theoretical result
in Proposition 3.40
For the “Anglo-Saxon” model, we expect a zero correlation between wage dispersion
and unemployment of the unskilled, since wages of the unskilled do not react to changes
in the wages of the skilled. If the wage dispersion increases, it increases enough to ad-
just to changes in relative labor demand. Unemployment remains unchanged while wage
dispersion increases. A regression of the unemployment rate of the unskilled, uu,t, on the
skill premium for the U.S., 1975 - 2003 yields:41
ûu,t = 9.997
(2.231)
+ 0.013
(0.650)
· ws,t
wu,t
(
R2 = 0.0000
)
39wu is the wage for unskilled workers as categorized by the lowest performance group of blue-collar
workers (“Leistungsgruppe 3, Arbeiter”). ws is the wage for skilled workers as categorized by the highest
performance group of white-collar workers (“Leistungsgruppe 2, Angestellte”), Source: German Federal
Statistical Office. Unemployment rates by qualification are from Reinberg and Hummel (2002) and Rein-
berg and Hummel (2005).
40The finding that higher wage dispersion and unemployment are positively correlated (across age-by-
education cells) in Germany is also found and discussed by Fitzenberger and Garloff (2004).
41Unemployment rates by educational attainment stem from U.S. Census Bureau (1975 - 2004) and
Francesconi, Orszag, Phelps, and Zoega (1998). Wages stem from the CPS (U.S. Census Bureau, internet
release, www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/incpertoc.html).
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where again standard errors are given in parentheses. Here, the relation between the wage
premium and unemployment is insignificant, as we expected. 42
B Proofs, Derivations, etc.
B.1 The Nash-Bargaining Solution
Subsection 4.1 considers the case where the wage is determined in negotiations between
the union and firms. The outcome of the negotiation is modeled as the general Nash-
Bargaining solution and is given by:
w∗u = e
λ
λ+ρ·(1−λ) ·
 φ·ρ·
(
ρ·au
w∗u
) ρ
1−ρ
(
ρ·au
w∗u
) ρ
1−ρ
+a
ρ
s
+1−ρ

· µ ·
(
ρ·au
w∗u
) ρ
1−ρ + aρs
2
Comparative statics with respect to the productivity parameters yield:
∂wu
∂au
· au
wu
=
ηY,lu ·
[
ηY,lu +
(
1 + φ · ρ · λλ+ρ·(1−λ)
)
· ηY,ls
]
ρ · (1− ρ) + ηY,lu ·
[
ηY,lu +
(
1 + φ · ρ · λλ+ρ·(1−λ)
)
· ηY,ls
] > 0
∂lu
∂au
· au
lu
=
(
1− λλ+ρ·(1−λ) · φ · ηY,lu
)
· ηY,ls
1− ρ+ ηY,lu ·
(
1 + λλ+ρ·(1−λ) · φ · ηY,ls
) > 0
∂wu
∂as
· as
wu
=
ηY,ls ·
(
1− λλ+ρ·(1−λ) · φ · ηY,ls
)
1 + ηY,lu1−ρ ·
(
1 + λλ+ρ·(1−λ) · φ · ηY,ls
) > 0
∂lu
∂as
· as
lu
=
∂lu
∂ asau
·
as
au
lu
= −
(
1− λλ+ρ·(1−λ) · φ · ηY,lu
)
· ηY,ls
1− ρ+ ηY,lu ·
(
1 + λλ+ρ·(1−λ) · φ · ηY,ls
) < 0
An increase in the unskilled workers productivity au leads to an increase in both em-
ployment of and wages for unskilled labor. This result corresponds to Proposition 1. An
increase in the skilled workers productivity as leads to an increase in the wage for unskilled
labor and a decrease in unskilled employment. This result corresponds to Proposition 2.
Skill-biased technological change (an increase in as/au) leads to a decrease in employment.
This result corresponds to Proposition 3.
B.2 CES Technology
Subsection 4.3 considers the case where the firm’s technology is of the more general CES
type:
Y = [(au · lu)ρ + (as · ls)ρ]
β
ρ
42Unemployment of the unskilled and wage dispersion are unlikely to contain a trend. While this is
obvious for the unemployment rate at least in an asymptotic sense, it is plausible for wage dispersion, too.
Nevertheless, we performed the same regression in first differences. Albeit less strongly, the regression
results remains significant for Germany (and insignificant for the United States).
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In this case, the equilibrium wage for and employment of unskilled labor are given by:
wu =
1
2
· e−
1
ηlu,wu · µ · Y lu = 2
µ
· ηY,lu · e
1
ηlu,wu
Employment effects of skill-biased technological change can be derived as:
∂lu
∂a
a
lu
= −ρ
(
1
1−β− 11−ρ(
1
1−β+
1
1−ρ θ
)2 (1 + θ) + 1
)
θ
1+θ
1− ρ
(
1
1−β− 11−ρ(
1
1−β+
1
1−ρ θ
)2 (1 + θ) + 1
)
θ
1+θ
T 0 ⇔ ρ S 0
where θ =
(
as
aulu
)ρ
. Skill-biased technological change has adverse employment effects for
the unskilled if the elasticity of substitution between unskilled and skilled labor is larger
than 1. If unskilled and skilled labor are complements (ρ < 0), employment increases in
the presence of skill-biased technological change.
Proof. A sufficient condition for the above inequality to hold is that the numerator
1
1−β− 11−ρ(
1
1−β+
1
1−ρ θ
)2 θ+ θ1+θ and the denominator 1− ρ
(
1
1−β− 11−ρ(
1
1−β+
1
1−ρ θ
)2 θ + θ1+θ
)
are both positive.
For ρ ≤ 0, this is obvious. (Remember that β ∈ [0, 1].)
ρ > 0 :
Sign of the numerator:
(
1
1− β −
1
1− ρ
)
(1 + θ)(
1
1−β +
1
1−ρθ
)2 + 1 ?> 0
For β > ρ, the numerator is obviously positive.
For β < ρ,
(
1
1−β − 11−ρ
)
(1+θ)(
1
1−β+
1
1−ρ θ
)2 is most negative, when (1+θ)(
1
1−β+
1
1−ρ θ
)2 is largest.
Because
∂
(1+θ)
( 11−β+ 11−ρ θ)
2
∂θ < 0,
(1+θ)(
1
1−β+
1
1−ρ θ
)2 is largest when θ is smallest, ie, θ = 1 :
(
1
1− β −
1
1− ρ
)
(1 + θ)(
1
1−β +
1
1−ρθ
)2 + 1 = 2
(
1
1−β − 11−ρ
)
+
(
1
1−β +
1
1−ρ
)2
(
1
1−β +
1
1−ρ
)2 > 0
⇔ β =
2 + 11−ρ −
√
1 + 4 11−ρ
1 + 11−ρ −
√
1 + 4 11−ρ
> 1
This means that the numerator can never be negative. Even with θ = 1, β would have to
be larger than 1 for
(
1
1−β − 11−ρ
)
(1+θ)(
1
1−β+
1
1−ρ θ
)2 + 1 to become negative.
This establishes that the numerator is positive.
Sign of the Denominator
22
1− ρ
 11−β − 11−ρ(
1
1−β +
1
1−ρθ
)2 θ + θ1 + θ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
?
> 0
The second part of the left hand side of the inequality is increasing with θ :
∂ρ
(
1
1−β− 11−ρ(
1
1−β+
1
1−ρ θ
)2 θ + θ1+θ
)
∂θ
> 0.
Because the inequality holds even for θ →∞ :
lim
θ→∞
1− ρ
 11−β − 11−ρ(
1
1−β +
1
1−ρθ
)2 θ + θ1 + θ
 = 1− ρ > 0
it must hold for all possible values of θ. This establishes that the denominator is positive.
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